Research in the area of self-awareness theory has indicated that self-focused attention consistently produces both an increase in perceived intensity of affect and enhanced accuracy of self-reports. The present studies consider these effects in relation to the technique of self-confrontation as used in psychotherapy. In the first study, members of two different clinical populations (alcoholics and general psychiatric patients) either were or were not made self-aware and then were asked to self-report on their psychiatric problems and their mood states. Results indicated that self-awareness did increase the negative mood states for the psychiatric patients, and it also apparently increased the accuracy with which both patient groups reported on their history of hospitalization. In the second study self-awareness once again exacerbated the reported negative affect of a group of depressed psychiatric patients and enhanced the accuracy with which they reported on their hospitalizations. Additional analyses indicated that although the psychiatric patients generally felt worse when self-aware, they were also more accurate in their self-reports, including descriptions of their problems. The effects of self-awareness on members of a clinical population are discussed and related to self-confrontation techniques.
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The popularity of self-confrontation techniques, such as videotape and audiotape feedback, that are used in various kinds of psychotherapy has continued to increase in the last 10-12 years, despite numerous inconsistencies in the research concerning their effectiveness. As early as 1969, Geertsma warned that the application of this technique, in which clients observe or listen to tapes of their own behavior, may be outdistancing the assessment of its effectiveness. More efforts should be made, he said, to increase the scientific understanding that underlies the application of self-confrontation to care of The authors would like to thank Judy Levy, who served as the experimenter in the first study, and Thomas Patterson, Carrol Ohlde, and the staff of the ColmeryOneil Veterans Hospital in Topeka, Kansas, for their invaluable assistance in completing this study.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Frederick X. Gibbons, Department of Psychology, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011. psychiatric clients. However, recent attempts to examine the utility of the technique have produced mixed results.
In a review of the relevant literature, Sanborn, Pyke, and Sanborn (1975) came to the conclusion that self-confrontation has proven to be a useful component of individual, group, marital, and family therapy. Those working in the area, according to these authors, have demonstrated convincingly that self-confrontation is likely to increase knowledge about one's behavior, and that "the more an individual knows about his [or her] behavior, the more he [or she] is in a position to do something about it" (p. 185). In a more recent review of this research, however, Gur and Sackeim (1978) severely criticized Sanborn et al.'s conclusion on several grounds. Gur and Sackeim stated that many of the studies cited by Sanborn et al. either did not include adequate control groups, did not actually concern self-confrontation per se, or, on closer examination, did not offer support for the efficacy of the technique. Moreover, Gur and Sackeim reviewed four additional controlled studies, which Sanborn et al. did not discuss, and pointed out that three of the four (Alkire & Brunse, 1974; Bailey, 1968; and Danet, 1968) found negative or deleterious effects with the technique. In summarizing their discussion, Gur and Sackeim offered two recommendations: (a) Utmost caution should be exercised when using self-confrontation in psychotherapy, and (b) there should be an increase in both the amount of laboratory research concerning self-confrontation and in attempts to integrate that research with relevant work being done in the area o f psychotherapy.
Self-Confrontation and Self-Focus
One area of laboratory research that Gut and Sackeim (1978) suggested may provide useful information about the process of selfconfrontation is the social psychological work prompted by objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975 Wicklund, , 1978 . This theory concerns behavior in a state of self-consciousness or self-focused attention, and all of the research done in this area to date has been conducted with samples of normal subjects. Typically, attention is directed internally in this paradigm by means of a focal manipulation, such as a mirror (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1978; Scheier & Carver, 1977) or a tape recorder (Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976 )--devices that are similar to those used during psychotherapy to initiate self-confrontation. Although there are a number of important distinctions between the state of self-awareness as it is induced in a laboratory setting and self-confrontation as it is used in therapy, nonetheless, the process of self-confrontation clearly involves a selffocusing of attention by the client. Moreover, results of research in this area have suggested that self-awareness has several behavioral effects that are especially relevant to psychotherapy (cf. Strong, 1978) . These effects, as they relate to self-confrontation, will be discussed.
Affect and Accuracy
According to Duval and Wicklund (1972) , when an individual is self-aware, his or her attention tends to focus on whatever dimension of self happens to be most salient at the time. As a consequence of this focusing of attention, the individual's subsequent behavior is likely to reflect an increase in both awareness of and responsivity to that particular dimension. Thus, a person who is experiencing anger toward another is more likely to aggress against that person if his or her attention is self-focused at the time (Scheier, 1976) . The same holds true for other transient affective states such as attraction and repulsion (Scheier & Carver, 1977) , and fear (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1981) . Theoretically, awareness of mood traits should also be enhanced by self-awareness. For example, one of the predominant self-dimensions of a person who is chronically depressed would be negative affect; awareness of this affect, therefore, should increase when attention is directed internally. This particular assumption of the theory has never been tested empirically, however.
By the same token, self-reports about salient self-dimensions appear to be more accurate if they are made while the subject is self-focused (cf. Gibbons, 1983) . For example in Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, and Hood (1977) , subjects' self-reports of their sociability and even their college entrance examination scores were more consistent with their actual behavior (i.e., objective measures of their social behavior and their actual test scores) if they reported while they were selfaware.
Attribution
Another postulate of self-awareness theory, which is relevant to a discussion of psychotherapy in general and self-confrontation techniques in particular, involves focus of attention and causal attributions. Duval and Wicklund (1973) and more recently Duval (1976) have suggested that atttributions of responsibility tend to follow focus of attention. Thus, a person who is self-focused should be more likely to explain his or her behavior in dispositional terms and accept responsibility for behavioral outcomes than would a person who is not concentrating on the self. In Duval and Wicklund (1973) , for example, subjects accepted more responsibility for hypothetical outcomes (e.g., winning a lottery) when their attention was self-reflected in a mirror; and in Duval, Duval, and Neely (1979) self-focused persons were more willing to accept responsibility for helping dependent others.
This internal-attribution effect is one consequence of the self-focused state that could prove especially useful to therapists who are interested in increasing the involvement of their patients in the treatment process. Indeed, this particular type of reaction was one of the main reasons why Strong (1978) concluded that "objective self-awareness is a vital part of psychotherapy," and that objective self-awareness along with empathy are "powerful tools for inducing change in psychotherapy" (pp. 119-120).
Defensiveness. As straightforward as the self-attribution hypothesis may seem, however, t recent research (Federoff & Harvey, 1976) has raised some serious questions about its validity; and, in fact, the attention/attribution issue remains a controversial one in the self-awareness literature (cf. Hull & Levy, 1979; Wicklund & Hormuth, 1981) . In particular, Federoffand Harvey (1976) examined the question of whether the tendency to selfattribute under self-focus holds true when the behavior and outcome in question are real (rather than hypothetical) and are threatening or have potentially negative consequences for the person's self-esteem. Subjects in this study worked on a task that involved trying to help another person and then received feedback indicating that they had either succeeded or failed. Results indicated that the subjects were involved in what they were doing and, more important, that they did not accept responsibility for their supposed failure if their attention was self-focused. In explaining the self-focused subjects' defensive responses, the authors suggested that self-awareness may increase sensitivity with regard to self-esteem. Put another way: The discomfort of failure is more intense when an individual is selffocused; consequently, the person may not be willing to accept responsibility for a behavior that led to a threatening outcome.
The results of the Federoff and Harvey (1976) study tend to complicate the selfawareness/self-confrontation issue. Assuming that an internal attribution for dysfunctional behavior threatens the self-esteem of a person, and it seems reasonable that it would, then psychiatric clients exposed to self-confrontation in psychotherapy might be unwilling either to accept more responsibility for their (pathological) behavior or to become more involved in the treatment process. If so, then Strong's (1978) speculation about the beneficial effects of self-awareness may be overly optimistic. In fact, given the possibility that self-focus could exacerbate the generally depressed state of many psychiatric clients as it does the transient affect states of college students (Carver & Scheier, 1978) , it could actually prove harmful to them.
In sum, the question of how clinical populations would respond to self-awareness manipulations appears to be an important one. One reason is that therapeutic methods that involve self-confrontation techniques place clients in a state of objective self-awareness, and previous research has suggested that this state could prove either beneficial or harmful to the therapy process and to the client. Another reason is that there are several theoretical questions that need to be examined empirically using this type of population (e.g., acceptance of responsibility for pathological behavior, intensification of chronic affect). To address these issues, two studies were conducted in which several relevant hypotheses derived from previous self-awareness research and from self-awareness theory were tested with subjects selected from clinical populations.
Study 1
Different types of clinical populations were used in these studies because the research cited by Gur and Sackeim (1978) indicated that reactions to self-confrontation are likely to vary as a function of the patient's psychopathology. Alcoholics and general psychiatric patients were chosen as subjects in the first study because these two groups tend to differ on several relevant psychological dimensions. The general psychiatric patients consisted of persons whose diagnoses included some form of chronic personality disorder and/or abnormal affect, whereas the diagnoses of the alOthers have suggested the same or similar hypotheses (cf. Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1975) . A m e r i c a n Psychiatric Association, 1980). Consequently, we a n t i c i p a t e d an e x a c e r b a t i o n o f affect for the f o r m e r group, m o r e so t h a n the latter, w h e n attention was self-focused. Additionally, the characteristics o f the treatm e n t p r o g r a m s in w h i c h these two groups were i n v o l v e d differed such that m u c h greater e m p h a s i s was placed on i n v o l v e m e n t in the therapy process for the alcoholics, i n c l u d i n g a s s u m i n g responsibility for their substanceabuse p r o b l e m and t r e a t m e n t o f it. Therefore, we e x p e c t e d this g r o u p w o u l d be m o r e likely to accept responsibility (for their p r o b l e m s and their t r e a t m e n t ) t h a n w o u l d the general psychiatric patients. However, because o f the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f p r e v i o u s research in the area o f self-awareness, no specific predictions could be m a d e regarding the effect o f self-focus on either g r o u p o f patients' causal a t t r i b u t i o n s for their problems.
To recapitulate, the hypotheses were that self-focused attention w o u l d e n h a n c e (a) the awareness o f and responsivity to the p r e d o mi n a n t affective state (which should be m o r e negative for the psychiatric patients), and (b) the a c c u r a c y with w h i c h subjects report on objective, n o n t h r e a t e n i n g aspects o f their 
Method Subjects
Subjects were 40 male inpatients from a Veterans Administration hospital• One half of the subjects were residents in an intensive inpatient treatment program for chronic alcoholism. The average age of this group was 46.0 years. The remaining 20 subjects were residents in general psychiatry inpatient wards; their average age was 36. l years. All of the subjects chosen for this group had diagnoses ranging from borderline personality and depression to manic-depressive illness and schizophrenia. Despite the severity of some of their diagnoses, the ward physician judged all of the psychiatric subjects capable of participating effectively in the study in terms of willingness and ability to answer questions. The physician also considered the subjects typical of the alcoholic and psychiatric populations at the hospital.
Procedure
After signing an informed consent statement, subjects were instructed to have a seat at a desk. They were told that the study concerned patients' opinions of various aspects of the hospital, and that the questionnaire dealt with "how people feel about different things when they come into the hospital." It was stressed to them that there were no right or wrong answers--only opinions--and that all of their responses would remain confidential. Finally, they were asked to be as honest and accurate as possible when responding. The experimenter left the subject alone while the subject filled out the questionnaire. When the subject finished, the experimenter returned and debriefed him thoroughly.
Self-Jbcus manipulation.
A medium-size mirror was placed on the desk in front of the subject. In the selffocus condition the mirror faced the subject so that it reflected his head and shoulders, whereas in the non selffocused condition it faced away from him. Subjects from each sample were randomly assigned to a mirror or to a no-mirror condition. The experimenter apologized for what she called excess equipment, but made no other mention of the mirror.
Questionnaires. The first questionnaire pertained to the subject's perceptions of his problem. This included items on the seriousness of the problem and the role that luck played in its determination, as well as the subject's perceptions of his responsibility for its onset and treatment. Questions pertaining to each of these four areas were presented in either a six-response multichoice format, or 7-point Likert-type scales. Each area contained three or four items, which were summed separately to form four different indexes (some items were reversed for scoring).
Examples of items in the responsibility for problem index were "How much do you think you are responsible for your problem?" (six choices, from It is totally my own responsibility to It is not my responsibility at all) and "Most of the time when people get into trouble it is their own fault" (agree-disagree, including 7 points). Other sample items in the problem severity index were "How serious do you think your problem is?"; in the luck index, "How much do you think bad luck or fate is to blame for your problem?"; and in the responsibility for treatment index, "Do you think that you can do anything to help yourself get better?" Subjects then responded to a shortened version of the state form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) . Five items indicating positive affect ("I feel
calm/rested/pleasant/joyful/comfortable"), and six items indicating negative affect (nervous/tense/worried/ upset/and overexcited, from the STAI, plus frustrated) were summed separately to form two indexes. Finally, subjects were asked to indicate how long they had had their particular problem and how many times they had been hospitalized for it. Note. n = 10 per cell. "A higher number reflects a more internal attribution; numbers of items are in parentheses. Scale = for 3 items, 3-18; for 4 items, 4-24. b Numbers of items are in parentheses. Scale = 5-20 for positive index; 6-24 for negative index. c Ratio = reported/actual.
Results

Responsibility and Problem Severity Indexes
sures. The means for the indexes are presented in Table 1 . These analyses revealed main effects for patient type on three of the indexes; the alcoholics (a) attributed more responsibility internally on both the responsibility for problem and treatment indexes, Fs(1, 36) = 11.65 and 4.66, ps < .002 and .04, respectively, and (b) reported that luck was a less important factor in their life, F(1, 36) = 4.60, p < .04, than did the psychiatric group. There were no significant effects on the problem severity index (all ps > ,20). In addition, there were no significant effects of mirror, nor were there any significant Mirror × Patient interactions on any of the indexes (all ps > .20). Thus, the data reflected the anticipated differences between the two types of patients in terms of acceptance of responsibility, but there was no evidence that the mirror increased subjects' willingness to accept responsibility for their problems.
Affect
An overall index of general affect was calculated for each subject by subtracting the total of the negative items from that of the positive items (see Table 1 ). An ANOVA of this overall index indicated that the general psychiatric patients" moods were more negative than were those of the alcoholics', F(l, 36) = 7.01, p < .02. In addition, both the main effect of mirror, F(l, 36) = 2.90, p < .10, and the Mirror X Patient Type interaction, F(1, 36) = 3.58, p < .07, were marginally significant. Individual planned comparisons (using the overall error term) indicated that both of these effects were due primarily to the self-focused general psychiatric subjects, whose mean m o o d score was significantly more negative than that of any other group (all ps < .02).
Separate analyses were also performed on the positive and negative indexes. There was a main effect of patient type on each of these indexes, as the general psychiatric patients reported more negative and less positive affect than did the alcoholics, Fs(1, 36) = 4.59 and 4.67, respectively; both ps < .04. A significant Mirror X Patient Type interaction on the negative index indicated that, as expected, the mirror exacerbated (reported) mood states, but only for the general psychiatric patients, F(1, 36) = 4.27, p < .05. Again, the mood score of this group was significantly more negative than that of any other group (all ps < .005). Neither the main effect of mirror nor the Mirror × Patient Type interaction was significant on the positive index (ps < .20).
Hospitalization Self-Reports
Times in hospital To check on the accuracy with which subjects were reporting their previous hospitalizations, we compared their self-reports with the record of the actual number of times they had been previously hospitalized (see Table 1 ). General psychiatric patients had been hospitalized significantly more often (M = 4.7) than had the alcoholics (M = 3.0), F(1, 33) = 5.85, p < .03. In addition, subjects who were self-aware reported more previous admissions (M = 4.8) than did those who were not (M = 2.3), F(I, 33) = 5.15, p < .04, even though they had not actually been hospitalized significantly more often (p > .28). To check on the accuracy of these reports, we performed an analysis on the most informative index of accuracy--in this case the ratio of reported to actual hospitalizations. This analysis revealed the expected effect of focus of attention, F(1, 33) = 5.42, p < .03, as the reports of the mirror subjects were much closer to the actual figures of previous admissions (ratio M = 1.11) than were those of the non self-aware subjects (M = .69).
As can be seen in Table 1 , self-aware subjects appeared to slightly overestimate their previous hospitalizations. This may be misleading, however. The actual number was based on the records available at the hospital where the patient was currently residing. It was stated by staff members at the hospital that, in a few cases, the records may have been incomplete with regard to previous admissions at other hospitals. Thus, the actual number used in the analysis may have underestimated the true number of hospitalizations. This suggests that the self-aware subjects were being more accurate, whereas the non self-aware subjects were underestimating.
Duration of illness. Consistent with their
tendency to report a greater number of hospitalizations, the mirror subjects also tended to report that they had had their problem longer (M = 16.4 months vs. 10.7 months), but this difference was not significant, F(I, 32) = 2.75, p < .15.
Discussion
Results with this clinical sample were consistent with those obtained from college students in previous self-awareness research and with our hypotheses on two important dimensions. First, responses on the STAI indicated that self-awareness did intensify subjects' reports of their predominant affective states. As expected, the general psychiatric patients generally felt worse than did the alcoholics, and the mirror exacerbated those feelings. Second, analyses of responses to the questions regarding hospitalization suggested that the mirror also increased the accuracy with which subjects reported on their hospitalization history. In contrast, no support was obtained for an internal attribution hypothesis because the self-focused subjects were no more likely than were the non self-focused group to accept responsibility for either the onset or the treatment of their problem, regardless of its nature.
We can conclude, then, that two of the three hypotheses did receive some support. Nonetheless, caution is warranted in interpreting these results for several reasons. To begin with, although the general psychiatric group consisted primarily of persons with affective disorders, there were others in this group who were not diagnosed as having these problems. Because there was no predominant negative affective state for these people, they would not have been expected to report more intense negative moods when self-aware. However, we did not have access to the specific diagnoses of all of the subjects, and so the data could not be analyzed separately. Moreover, we were comparing the responses of our general psychiatric sample with those of another group of persons who also had psychiatric problems--the alcoholics. Another important control group for these people would have been a comparable group of men who did not have any psychiatric or emotional problems. Still another reason for concern with the results of the first study is that although the data on hospitalization do suggest enhanced accuracy due to self-awareness, they are based on a relatively small sample o f people. A replication would greatly increase o u r confidence in this finding.
A final issue raised by the first study has to do with the subjects' attributions. Although the data on the two responsibility indexes indicate that self-aware subjects did n o t accept m o r e responsibility for their problems, they do n o t indicate why this was the case. O n e possibility is that they were being defensive a b o u t their p r o b l e m (cf. Federoff & Harvey, 1976 ) a n d were d e n y i n g their part in it. A n o t h e r possibility, which is consistent with the hospitalization data, is that they were n o t accepting additional responsibility for their p r o b l e m or its t r e a t m e n t because they were actually trying to be as accurate as they could in reporting a b o u t their role in it. Because we had n o i n d e p e n d e n t m e a s u r e o f their actual participation in the t r e a t m e n t process or o f the severity o f their p r o b l e m , we could n o t e x a m i n e this latter possibility.
For these reasons a second study was conducted that i n c l u d e d a n o t h e r g r o u p of psychiatric patients, b u t with a n u m b e r o f m o difications. T h e modifications were as follows: (a) Specific diagnoses for all subjects were o b t a i n e d so that we could distinguish those with serious affective disorders from those without such problems, (b) a control g r o u p of n o n p s y c h i a t r i c patients was included, (c) a n o t h e r m o o d scale was used that provided i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t other types o f affect (depression a n d hostility in a d d i t i o n to anxiety), a n d (d) finally, a m o r e objective assessm e n t was o b t a i n e d from staff m e m b e r s a b o u t the psychiatric patients" p r o b l e m s so that the veridicality o f subjects' responses could be assessed.
Study 2
Method Subjects
Two separate groups of subjects were used in the second experiment. The control group consisted of 24 males who were medical patients at the same Veterans Administration hospital in which the first experiment was conducted. Their average age was 59.9, and their diagnoses ranged from frost bite and foot callouses to lung problems; the majority of them had some kind of stomach or foot ailment. The experimental group consisted of 28 psychiatric patients also at the same hospital. Their average age was 40.1, and their-diagnoses ranged from alcoholism to psychotic depression. One subject in this group was not included in the analysis, due to lack of cooperation in filling out the questionnaire. Of the remaining 27 subjects, there were 15 whose primary diagnosis included severe affective disorder (i.e., depression), 4 were diagnosed as alcoholics, and 8 had less severe personality disorders.
Procedure
Questionnaire. The procedure was identical to that used in the first experiment in terms of introduction and explanation of the mirror and questionnaire. A modified version of the questionnaire that contained three sections was used "this time. In the first section, the luck index was dropped, and the two responsibility indexes were reduced to two questions each and combined. Questions on the problem responsibility index were "How much do you think that you are responsible for your problem?" (all questions had six choices) and "Could you have done anything to avoid this problem?" On the treatment responsibility index the questions were "Do you think that you can do anything to help yourself get better?" and "Who do you think is most responsible for treatment of your problem?" (from the doctor is entire responsible to I am entirely responsible). The problem severity index consisted of three questions: "How serious is it," "How much does it bother you," and "How long until recovery?" The second section contained a shortened version of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) . This list assesses three types of affect--hostility, anxiety, and depression--and includes a positive and negative subscale for each type. Each of the six subscales contained eight items. In scoring this MAACL, one point was assigned on the positive subscales for each mood adjective that was not checked (e.g., cheerful, enthusiastic, glad), and one point was assigned on the negative subscales for each item that was checked (e.g., discouraged, gloomy, disagreeable). Finally, section three of the questionnaire contained two questions on the patients' hospitalization record: "How long have you been hospitalized for this problem?" and "How long have you had this problem?" and three demographic questions (age, education, and marital status).
Staff evaluations. Each psychiatric subject was evaluated by two staff members (psychiatric nurses) who were familiar with them. The evaluation question s were "How severe do you think this patient's problem is?" "What is his overall level of adjustment? .... To what extent does this patient actively participate in his treatment process?" "How would you describe the patient's general morale state?" (from very happy to severely depressed), and "Please evaluate the patient on the following two dimensions: hostility and anxiety" (each 6 points). In addition, hospital records were obtained for subjects' diagnoses, number of hospitalizations for their problem, dates of those hospitalizations, and the demographics such as marital status?
2 Correlations that were calculated between subjects' self-reports of these demographic variables and the hospital records of them indicated that all subjects were being very accurate on these variables (e.g., rs > .85). Consequently, these analyses are not discussed further. All significance tests are two-tailed, unless otherwise indicated. ' Means for the negative subscales for each of the three types of affect, for the control and the depressed psychiatric subjects. Scale = 1-8. b Means without common subscripts differ at the .05 level.
Results
Part 1: Replication
Indexes. An ANOVA of the problem severity, and the two responsibility indexes, revealed no differences due to group or mirror and no interactions involving these two variables on any o f the indexes or on the individual questions (all ps > . 15).
Positive affect. Our hypothesis suggested that self-focused attention should intensify the predominant affective states o f our subjects. To examine this hypothesis, we chose only those people in the psychiatric group who were experiencing some kind o f severe affective disorder. Because there was no predominant negative effect in the other subjects, we did not expect them to report intensified affect when self-aware. Thus, data from the 15 subjects (8 in the mirror and 7 in the nomirror conditions) whose primary diagnosis included depression were analyzed in a 2 × 2 ANOVA with the same data from the control group. Separate analyses o f each of the subscales revealed a main effect for group on each o f the three positive scales, as the control group checked off many more of these items than did the experimental group (all ps < .006). However, there were no significant differences due to mirror presence nor an interaction, primarily because very few o f the psychiatric subjects checked off any of the eight positive items (mean number o f items checked a m o n g this group = 0.6 for depression, 1.4 for hostility, and 0.6 for anxiety).
Negative affect. Considerably more o f the negative items were checked by the psychiatric group, and analyses o f these data did reveal the expected differences, replicating those found in the first experiment (see Table 2 ). Again there were significant main effects o f group on each of the three negative subscales (all ps < .001). More important, there were significant Mirror × G r o u p interactions on each of the subscales as well as on the total of the three: Fs(l, 35) for anxiety = 8.03, p < .0 l; depression = 6.14, p < .02; hostility = 3.40, p < .08; and the total --8.78, p < .01. 3 In addition, simple effects analyses indicated that the mirror/depressed cell was significantly higher than the no-mirror/depressed cell for each of the three subscales (all ts > 1.97, ps < .06) and for the total (t--2.80, p < .01). 4
Self-report of hospitalization. Correlations were calculated for all subjects between their self-reports o f the a m o u n t o f time they had had their problem and the hospital records on these figures. Our hypothesis, based on the first experiment and previous research in 3 As can be seen in the table, very few of the subjects in the mirror control condition checked any of the negative adjectives. Although this is not inconsistent with our reasoning, it does present a problem in terms of homogeneity of variance for this analysis, and so these analyses should be interpreted with some caution.
4 The mean of the nondepressed psychiatric patients (M = 6.50) was significantly less than that of the selfaware, depressed group (p < .05), but not different from the non self-aware depressed group (p > .25). 2.38** a Correlations between self-report and hospital records of hospitalization history for all subjects. *p < .10. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All are one-tailed.
this area, was that these correlations would be much higher for those subjects who answered in the presence o f a mirror, and this was, in fact, the case on all three items (see Table 3 ). The correlations between (a) selfreport of length o f hospitalization for problem and the record of time since first hospitalization for it were r(21) = .62, p < .01, in the m i r r o r condition, and r (18) 12, p > . 10. Z tests for the differences between the correlations of the two groups (which are very stringent with such small ns) were significant on one comparison and marginal on the other two; ps --.10, .009, and .09, respectively, one'tailed. 6
Part 2: Comparison With Staff Ratings
Indexes. To obtain a check on the validity o f the psychiatric subjects' responses on the responsibility, severity, and affect indexes, we correlated these responses with the c o m p arable evaluations of the subjects given by the staff members. 7 Very different results were obtained on the affect as opposed to the other indexes, so those responses are treated separately. (All correlations are presented in Table  4 .) First, a comparison o f subjects' evaluations of how serious their p r o b l e m s were (i.e., the question " H o w serious is your p r o b l e m ? " as well as the seriousness index) with staff m e mbers' assessments of their seriousness indicated that the m i r r o r subjects were once again very accurate in their self-reports. Correlations in this condition, rs(l 1) = .77 and .60, ps < .02, tended to be higher than were those in the n o -m i r r o r condition, r s ( 1 2 ) = .26 and .36, ps > . 10, although these differences were not significant (z = 1.72, p < .10, and z = .75, ns, two-tailed). Similarly, self-focused subjects' responses on the item " D o you think that you can do anything to help yourself get better?" and on the treatment responsibility index, tended to be congruent with staff m e m b e r s ' assessments of their actual participation in treatment, rs(11) = .4! and .42, ps < .08, whereas those of the non selffocused group definitely were not, r ( 1 2 ) = -. 3 5 and -. 5 3 , ns; c o m p a r i s o n z = 1.84, p < ,07, and z = 2.37, p < .02, two-tailed. 8 In addition, as can be seen in the table, these differences between the correlations o f the 5 Reductions in degrees of freedom on these measures reflect data missing from the hospital records.
6 These same correlations and comparisons were also calculated using only the depressed subjects from the two experimental conditions. On the first two pairs of correlations, the difference between the two groups (mirror and no mirror) was even greater for the depressed subjects; on the third it was somewhat smaller.
7 Correlations were calculated between subjects' selfreports and the sum of the two staff ratings. The two staff ratings (made by several different members because no one was familiar with all of the subjects) correlated .56 for the problem severity assessment, .54 for the question on participation in treatment, and .68, .33, and .48, respectively, for the ratings on the three affective dimensions (hostility, anxiety, and depression).
s It should be pointed out that although the questions asked of the staff and subjects in this particular case both dealt with the same issue, namely, acceptance of responsibility for treatment, one of those questions was behavioral in nature and the other attitudinal, and they were certainly not identical. This might explain why these correlations were somewhat lower than the others. Note. Adjsum = sum of negative affect subscales (either self-or staff-report); Problem = How serious is the problem?;
Treatment participation = staff assessment of subject's participation in treatment; Treatment responsibility = treatment responsibility index. There were too few depressed subjects to allow for meaningful comparison of correlations. *p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. All are two-tailed.
two groups once again tended to be greater a m o n g the depressed subjects. Affect. A very different picture emerged, however, when subjects' self-reports o f their affective states were compared with staff assessments o f their chronic affective traits. On the three negative subscales, the correlations in the mirror condition were very l o w --hostility = .07, anxiety = .22, depression = -. 2 6 , and total negative sum = .15, all ps > .20--whereas they were relatively high in the no-mirror condition --.78, .58, .22, and .61, ps < .001, .02, .25, and .01, respectively . In summary, results of these correlation analyses suggested that self-focused attention enhanced the validity o f subjects' self-reports o f hospitalization, problem severity, and treatment participation: The correlations on these items were considerably higher in the mirror than in the no-mirror condition. In contrast, the mirror appeared to reduce the validity o f the psychiatric subjects' reports o f affect. One reason for this inaccuracy appears to be that the self-aware psychiatric subjects' self-reports reflected their current m o o d states--which were exacerbated by the m i r r o r --w h e r e a s the assessments of the staff were based on their typical mood states, or actually, their m o o d traits.
General Discussion
The results from the present studies suggest a complex relationship among focus o f attention, patient type, and psychological processes. First, the finding that self-focused attention increased negative m o o d o f the psychiatric patients is consistent with previous selfawareness studies in which self-focused attention has been found to enhance the perception o f predominant affect (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1978; Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1981) . However, in the earlier research, subjects' moods were temporarily enhanced by an experimental manipulation o f some sort, whereas that was not the case in the present experiment as there were no such manipulations. Thus, the mirror exacerbated the chronic negative affective states that the depressed subjects were experiencing at the time. This finding is also consistent with selfconfrontation research by Geertsma & Reivich (1965; Reivich & Geertsma, 1968) in which members of clinical populations (e.g., people diagnosed as depressed) responded to their images in a deprecating or defensive manner.
Secondly, self-focused attention increased the accuracy with which subjects in these two studies described their history of hospitalizations. This also is consistent with previous studies in which self-focus was associated with increased accuracy of self-assessment among normal subjects (e.g., Gibbons, 1983; Pryor et al., 1977) . Moreover, this occurred in the present studies even among subjects who had been diagnosed as chronically depressed and who were experiencing heightened negative affect at the time they were reporting.
Defensiveness or Accuracy?
Self-focused attention did not increase patients' acceptance of responsibility for the determination of their problem or for participation in their treatment in either experiment. As with any negative finding, one can only speculate about the reason for the lack of significant effects. It does seem clear, though, that the present measures of patient acceptance of responsibility were reasonably sensitive: Consistent with actual treatment practices for these respective disorders, alcoholics reported more acceptance of responsibility than did the general psychiatric patients. Why then were the effects of self-focus in the current studies similar to those evidenced in previous self-awareness research on two dimensions--affect and accuracy--but not on the dimension of attributions of responsibility?
One reason that self-focused attention failed to increase internal attributions of responsibility may be due to defensiveness associated with the negative impact that such increased acceptance would undoubtedly have had on patients' self-esteem (cf. Federoff & Harvey, 1976) . Results of the additional correlational analyses in the second experiment suggest a different interpretation, however. These results indicated that on potentially threatening items such as the assessment of problem severity and participation in treatment, the self-aware psychiatric subjects were being fairly accurate in their self-descriptions. Keeping in mind that these analyses were based on a small number of people, it seems reasonable to conclude that the depressed subjects who were self-aware were not denying the existence of their problem nor were they being defensive about it; apparently they did not attribute more responsibility to themselves for the problem because they were trying to be as accurate as they could in reporting about it. In contrast, a comparison of the self-aware subjects' reports of their affect states with the staff reports of their chronic affect traits produced virtually no evidence of accuracy. It would appear, then, that making depressed persons self-aware while they are contemplating their psychiatric problems does facilitate accurate reporting on the facts about those problems. However, at the same time, it decreases accuracy in self-descriptions of affect because it also temporarily exacerbates their negative mood states.
Self-Focus and Depression
The current results add to a growing body of research that presents evidence of an interesting parallel between the psychological states of depression and self-awareness. Significant correlations between the private subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale, which is a dispositional measure of chronic selffocus (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) , and measures of depression such as the Dempsey D30 scale (Dempsey, 1964) , demonstrated by Smith & Greenberg (1981) , and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967) , demonstrated by Ingram & Smith (1984) , have been found in recent studies in this area. Besides the obvious similarity that both depression and self-awareness are associated with intensified affect, there is also the additional factor of enhanced accuracy of self-assessment. For example, Abramson (1979, 1981) found that depressives are more accurate in their perception of the amount of control they have in contingency learning situations. And Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, and Barton (1980) found depressives to be more realistic (again relative to nondepressed persons) in their assessments of their own social competence. Thus, both self-aware persons and those who are depressed apparently are less likely to exaggerate or embellish their self-reports than are nondepressed or non self-focused persons. Taken together, these studies present convincing evidence that depressed persons do tend to be chronically self-focused. To the extent that this is true, and self-focus and depression are related, then there is even more reason to believe that therapists and others working with depressed individuals need to be wary of therapy techniques that involve increasing their self-attention. Too much self-focus can be aversive (cf. Wicklund, 1978) , and it seems clear that this would be especially true for persons in a depressed state.
Self-Awareness and Self-Confrontation
At this point it might appear that there is little evidence in our data of beneficial effects of self-focus for members of a clinical population. Before applying these results to the technique of self-confrontation, however, it is important to point out again that there are many differences between the state of selfawareness as it was induced in this study and the situation that typically occurs in the psychotherapeutic encounter. Although the technique of self-confrontation does involve a self-focusing of attention by the client, it also typically involves active participation by a psychotherapist. In fact, most of the previous studies cited by Gur and Sackeim (1978) that showed either positive or neutral effects of self-confrontation involved situations in which the client and the therapist worked together to analyze the client's dysfunctional behavior. Presumably in these situations, the therapist was able to help the client avoid the negative self-evaluation that can be a concomitant of the self-focused state. Possibly by focusing clients' attention on aspects of their behavior that could be changed, therapists may be able to lead them to believe that improvement is possible.
A study by Steenbarger and Aderman (1979) is relevant to this issue. These authors believed that the negative mood state and the decline in self-esteem demonstrated by selfaware subjects in previous studies occurs only when people are self-evaluating and feel that there is little they can do to improve their behavior. When subjects in their study were told they had failed at a task, self-awareness did not exacerbate their negative mood states if they were also told that there were certain specific things that they could do to improve their performance. This suggests that the psychotherapist can play an important role in alleviating the affect exacerbation effect. By working with the client and pointing out specific ways to improve the dysfunctional behavior, there is reason to expect that the therapist can reduce the aversiveness of the client's self-evaluation. A similar notion has been put forth by Carver, Blaney, and Scheier (1979; see also Carver & Scheier, 1982) , who suggested that self-awareness can lead to increased effort toward discrepancy reduction or self-improvement, when the individual believes that positive change is possible. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that self-awareness may increase client's motivation to work at improvement, as it has been shown to increase motivation to perform various other kinds of tasks (e.g., Wicklund & Duval, 1971 ). This possibility of enhanced therapeutic motivation definitely warrants future investigation.
Conclusion. Although these results appear
to be mixed, they do suggest that self-focused attention can be of some value in the therapeutic process when used judiciously under carefully controlled conditions. On the positive side is the evidence suggesting that the technique can enhance the predictive and descriptive validity of various psychological instruments. Presumably this would include diagnostic measures as well--an effect that could prove to be of considerable use in testing and assessment. By the same token, it seems clear that an accurate assessment by the client of the nature and the intensity of his or her problem may very well be an important first step toward recovery (Sanborn et al., 1975) . On the other hand, the results on the affective measures portend problems that certainly cannot be overlooked. Much as a provoked person experiences more intense anger when his or her attention is directed internally (Scheier, 1976) , so a depressed person is likely to feel worse when confronted by his or her own image. This suggests that this particular type of problem and client might best be treated with techniques that purposely direct attention away from the self, at least as long as affect continues to be a serious problem. In general it would appear that the effects of self-focus in the therapeutic realm are more varied and complex than previous researchers might have thought. For this reason we agree with Gur and Sackeim's (1978) observation that this type of situation clearly warrants utmost caution, and, just as important, more intensive future research efforts as well.
